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Another suggestion contained in this paper
which we do not remember to have seen ex-
pressed elsewhere is, that the true way to
render an appellate tribunal attractive to the
more eminent minds among the profession,
and to give to its incumbents fair opportuni-
ties for complete development, is to relieve
it of the necessity of trying insignificant cases
of no merit and of but little interest, in con-
sequence of the principles involved, and thus
enable it to devote its time and attention to
the careful elucidation of the cases of real
importance which come before it. This ob-
ject, he thinks, will, in a measure, be accom-
plished by the establishment of the pecuniary
limit to the right of appeal.
INSANITY-BURDEN OF PROOF.
The defense interposed in the Guiteau case
has served to direct attention to the law of
insanity in criminal cases, to an extent hither-
to unknown. The acquittal of Sickles in the
District of Columbia, and of Cole, and of
McFarland in New York, served to create a
public sentiment which has been constantly
growing, and which, looking upon the defense
of insanity as a "dodge," demands that the
law shall be strictly construed, and so rigid a
rule laid down as shall make it impossible
that such a defense should be successful, un-
less the prisoner was unquestionably insane.
The danger is, that in laying down the rule so
rigidly, the actually insane may be unjustly
convicted. Such a result is to be avoided,
unless we are prepared to act upon the theory
advanced by some, that a murderer should be
executed whether he be sane or insane. 1 We
do not believe that such a theory will find fa-
vor to any extent. "Without reference to
sentiment or ideas of duty," as an eminent
gentleman recently said, "or to any philo-
sophical reasoning whatever, it is practically
impossible for a civilized nation to deliberate-
ly and consistently inflict the highest punish-
ment of responsible crime on irresponsible
lunatics, or to shoot them down as wild bulls
running through the streets; for to do this
1 This view is advocated by Dr. Elwell, a distin-
guished writer on Medical Jurisprudence in the
North Amerlcan Reviec, for January, 1882.
we must ourselves first become rebarbarized;
the weapon of our defense would burst in our
hands-we should destroy our civilization in
the very effort to save it."2 If, then, in the
interest of justice and civilization, the extreme
penalty of the law is not to be visited upon
the insane criminal, several questions of great
interest arise: What shall be done with him?
What shall be the test of responsibility?
Shall the burden of proof of insanity rest up-
on him, or upon the prosecution? It is to
the last of these inquiries that we direct at-
tention. Upon this question, as is well
known, different theories prevail, and we pro-
pose to present the rulings upon the subject
in the courts of the several States, for the
purpose of ascertaining just how the matter
stands at the present time.
I. The first theory to be noticed is that
which holds that the burden of proof rests in
such cases upon the prisoner. And this the-
ory is the one adopted in the following States:
In Alabama it was recognized in 1850, in
McAllister v. State,3 and in 1880, in Boswell
v. State, 4 it was reaffirmed after careful argu-
ment and exhaustive consideration. In this
last case insanity is said to be "a defense
which must be proved to the satisfaction of
the jury by that measure of proof which is
required in civil causes, and a reasonable
doubt of sanity raised by all the evidence does
not authorize an acquittal."
In Arkansas it was adopted in 1870, in
McKenzie v. State,5 where the question is
briefly considered, and the opinion expressed
that the prisoner must produce evidneec suf-
ficient to change the presumption of his san-
ity. No authorities are cited by the court.
In California this doctrine was adopted in
1862, in People v. Myers,6 where the court
declared that the prisoner must establish his
defense of insanity, and that he must estab-
lish it by a preponderance of evidence, not
merely by raising a doubt in the minds of the
jury. This doctrine has been reaffirmed in a
number of cases, the last of which was de-
cided in September, 1881.
7
2 Ibid. Dr. George M. Beard's article.
1 17 Ala. 436.
4 63 Ala. 307.
26 Ark. 384, 341.
2 0 Cal. 518.
7 People v. Coffman, 24 Cal. 233; People v. McDon-
nell. 47 Cal. 184; People v. Wilson, 49 Cal. 14; People
v. Wreden, 12 Reporter, 682.
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In Connecticut the subject was briefly con-
sidered in State v. Hoyt,8 decided in 1878.
No authorities were cited for or against the
conclusion reached. The subject was thus
summarily disposed of: "The accused in-
troduced a witness, an expert, upon the point
of insanity, and the court permitted an ex-
pert to testify upon the same subject in behalf
of the State by way of rebuttal. The accused
complains of this, and urges that the State
should have introduced this evidence in chief.
The complaint is without foundation. The
law presumes every person of mature years to
be of sound mind and competent to, commit
crime. If the defense be insanity, it is to be
proved substantially as an independent fact,
and the burden of proof is on the accused.
Upon this issue he goes forward and the State
rebuts."
In Delaware the matter has been under con-
sideration in a number of cases, and the same
conclusion reached in all. The prisoner is
bound to prove his insanity, and must prove
it beyond a reasonable doubt. 9
In Georgia the subject was considered in
1872. The jury had been charged that the
defense of insanity must have been proven to
their satisfaction, or they were bound to dis-
credit it. The Supreme Court said, in refer-
ence to this instruction: "Prima facie, all
persons are tW be considered sane; and this is
true in criminal as well as civil trials. If this
be the legal presumption, it would seem to
follow that unless the jury are satisfied of in-
sanity, they must consider the prisoner sane.
Perhaps the word satisfi.d is rather strong;
and were there any evidence here of insanity,.
we might hesitate to sustain the judge."' 0
In Iowa the question was settled in State v.
Felter," decided in 1871, in which the 'court
held that insanity was an. affirmative defense,
and that the prisoner must make it appear by
a preponderance of evidence. An instruction
was sustained which informed the jury that it
was unnecessary that they should be satisfied
beyond all reasonable doubt,"and that it' was
sufficient to justify an acquittal that they were
reasonably satisfied, upon a consideration of
S 46 Conn. 33Q, 337.
9 State v. Danby, 1 Houston (Cr. Cas.), 175; State
v. Pratt, 1 Houston (Cr. Cas.), 269; State v. Boice,
Ibid. 355; State v. Draper, Ibid. 531; State v. Thomas,
Ibid. 611.
10 Holsenbake v. State, 45 Ga. 65.
113 2 Iowa, 0.
the whole testimony, of the prisoner's insan-
ity.
In Kentucky, too, the burden of proof is
on the prisoner. It is there held, however, to
be insufficient that the evidence merely raises
a doubt as to the prisoner's mental sound-
ness, for the reason that this would be repel-
ling a legal presumption by evidence raising a
mere doubt or suspicion as to the mental con-
dition. In such a case the legal presumption
would amount to little, if to anything at all.3 2
In Maine the question underwent very care-
ful examination in State v. Lawrence,' 3 de-
cided in 1870, and the opinion of the court is
among the ablest of those holding the burden
to be upon the prisoner, and is well worthy
of great consideration. "It is undoubtedly
true," said the court, "that there can be no
guilt except as the result of the action of a
sound mind, there can be no crime except
there be a criminal; nevertheless there is a
palpable distinction between these two; one
can not exist without the other, still they are
two and not one and the same. The person
doing the act is not the act itself. I-Ic may
or may not be responsible for the act; but in
no sense can he be the act." The court goes
on to say that the defense of insanity is a
plea of confession and avoidance. It does
not meet any question propounded by the in-
dictment, but raises one outside of it. It is
not a denial, but a positive allegation, and the
prisoner assumes the affirmative, changing the
issue. The presumption of sanity continues
until removed by a preponderance of the evi-
dence. "Does it not," asks.the court, "and
must it not necessarily still stand, though we
may have some doubts of its truth? That
which exists is not destroyed simply because
it may be enveloped in a thin cloud. However
we may theorize, it will still exist until de-
molished. If this presumption is to be over-
thrown by a doubt, as well might it be
abolished at once."
In Massachusetts Chief Justice Shaw de-
clared in the noted case of Commonwealth v.
Rogers, decided in 1844, that, in order to
shield a prisoner from criminal responsibility,
the presumption of his sanity must be rebut-
ted by proof of the contrary satisfactory to
12 Kriel v. Commonwealth, 5 Bush, 362; Graham v.
Commonwealth, 16 B. Mon. 587; Smith v. Common-
wealth, 1 Duvall, 224.
13 57 Me. 574.
HeinOnline  -- 14 Cent. L.J. 2 1882
4 THE CENTRAL LAW JOURNXL."
the jury. 14 And he added that if a prepon-
derance of evidence was in favor of insanity,
the jury would be authorized to acquit the
prisoner. Again, in 1856, in Commonwealth
v. Eddy,m the court declared that the burden
of proof was on the State to prove the sanity
of defendant, but that the burden was sus
tained by the presumption of law that all men
are sane, until it was rebutted and overcome
by satisfactory evidence to the contrary. And
this doctrine has since been adhered to.
16
In Minnesota it was settled as early as 1858,
that the burden of proof as to insanity rested
on the prisoner. 17 The New York case of
People v. McCann,'S holding a contrary doc-
trine, was said to be 'controverted by the
weight of authority, and was expressly repudi-
ated as not being the safer and better rule.
This doctrine is still followed. 19
In Missouri this subject has been consid-
ered in a number of cases, in all of which it
is agreed that it rests on the prisoner to prove
his insanity. The question was considered as
early as 1848, when the court sustained thie
following instruction: "This defense is em-
phatically one which the defendant must make
out to the satisfaction of your minds. For
if the evidence merely shows a case of doubt
where the defendant might or might not be
insane, this is not sufficient to authorize an
acquittal. * * * * The evidence must
show satisfactorily to your minds that he was
insane at the time of the commission of the
act."12 0 This was afterwards adhered to in
State v. Hutiug,21 decided in 1855, when the
court held that b6 prisoner was not entitled to
the benefit of a reasonable doubt as to his
sanity. But in 1868, in State v. Klinger,
22
while the doctrine was sustained that the bur-
den rested on the prisoner, the court receded
from its former position, that it was necessa-
ry that the defense of insanity should be made
out beyond a reasonable doubt, and held it to
be sufficient if made out by a preponderance
of the evidence, and to the rensonable satis-
faction of the jury. And in 1873 this doe-
14 7 Metcalf, 500.
15 7 Gray, 583.
16 Commonwealth v. Heath, 11 Gray, 303.
17 Bonfanti v. State, 2 Minn. 123.
18 15 How. Pr. 503.
19 State v. Gut, 13 Minn. 341.
20 Baldwin v. State, 12 Mo. 223.
21 21 Mlo. 464.
22 43 Mo. 127.
trine was affirmed in State v. Smith, 23 and
again in 1880, in State v. Redemeier, 2' Hen-
ry, J., dissenting. The majority of the court
in the case last cited were of the opinion that
the wisdom of the rule was demonstrated by
the ease with which insanity could be simula-
ted, and that it was necessary for the protec-
tion of society.
In New Jersey it was held in State v. Spen-
cer, 25 decided in 1846, that where the evi-
dence left the question of insanity in doubt,
the jury must find againsu the prisoner, for
the reason that every man was to be presumed
sane until the contrary was clearly proven.
"When the evidence," so it was said, "of
sanity on the one side, and of insanity
on the other, leaves the scale in equal bal-
ance, or so nearly poised- that the jury have
a reasonable doubt of his insanity, then. a
man is to be considered sane and respon-
sible for what he does. But if the prob-
ability of his being insane at the time is, from
the evidence in the case, very strong, and
there is but a slight doubt 6f it, then the jury
would have a right, and ought to say, that the
evidence of his insanity was clear. The proof
of insanity at the time of committing the act
ought to be as clear and satisfactory, in order
to acquit him on the ground of insanity, as the
proof of committing the act ought to be, in
order to find a sane man guilty."
In North Carolina the matter was consid-
ered and summarily disposed of in Morehead
v. Brown, 26 where it was held that the prison-
er was to be considered sane until the contra-
ry was proven. And it was said that he is
"not required to show the matter of excuse
beyond a reasonable doubt; but must offer
such testimony' as will satisfy the jury that
his defense is established. He must prove his
case as you would require the proof of any fact
about which parties are at issue. Reasonable
doubt, in the humanity of our law, is exer-
cised for a prisoner's sake, that he may be
acquitted if his case will allow it. It is never
applied for his bondemnation."
And in Ohio the question Was raised and
settled in 1843, in Clark v. State. 27 In that
case it was determined that the burden was
28 53 Mo. 267.
24 71 Mo. -.
25 1 Zabriskie, 201.
266 Jones L. 366.
2712 Ohio, 483,
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with the pisoner to show, to the satisfaction
of the jury, the perverted condition of his
mind. The court declared that it would be
unsafe to let loose upon society great offenders
upon mere theory, hypothesis, or conjecture.
"A rule that would produce such a result
would endanger the community, by creating a
means of escape from criminal justice, which
the artful and experienced would not fail to
embrace." It was said not to be sufficient if
the proof barely shows that an insane state
of mind was .Possible, or even shows it to
have been probable. In 1857 the question
was again argued, and the court held that it
was sufficient if the prisoner established the
'fact of insanity by a preponderance of the
evidence.28 This has been followed in subse-
quent cases in the same court, the last having
been decided in 1876.29 In that case the
court took occasion to say that it considered
the question as having been settled by its
prior decisions, but that, if the question
could be considered as an open one, the ma-
* jority of the court would be in favor of the
rule as already laid down.
In Pennsylvania this subject received very
careful attention in Ortwein v. Common-
wealth,3 0 which was decided as recently as
1874, the opinion being delivered by Chief
Justice Agnew. "Soundness of mind is the
natural and normal condition of men, and is
necessarily presumed, not only because the
fact is generally so, but because a contrary
presumption would be fatal to the interests of
society. No one can justly claim irrespon-
sibility for his act contrary to the known na-
ture of the race of which he is one. He must
be treated and be adjudged to be a reasona-
ble being,until a fact so abnormal as a want of
reason positively appears. * *" * * The
evidence of insanity must be satisfactory and
not merely doubtful, as nothing less than
satisfaction can determine a reasonable mind
to believe a fact contrary to the course of
nature." The court declared that any dif-
ferent conclusion than the one announced
would fill the land with acquitted criminals.
Since that case was determined, the su'0ject
has been brought before the court in four
29 Loeffner v. State, 10 Ohio St., 598.
29 Bond v. State, 23 Ohio St. 349; Bergin v. State,
31 Ohio St. 115.
30 76 Pa. St. 423.
different cases, in 1874, 1876, 1878 and
1879.31 In each of these cases the court af-
grined its former ruling, and declared that
while the burden was on the prisoner, it was
not necessary that proof of his insanity
should be absolutely conclusive, but that it
might be established by "satisfactory and
fairly preponderating evidence.
In Tennessee the burden of proof is on the
prisoner, but when the proof of insanity
makes an equipoise, the presumption of san-
ity is neutralized and ceases to weigh, and
the jury are in reasonable doubt, and should
acquit.32 As to the argument that the safety
of society required that a criminal should
prove his insanity beyond a reasonable doubt,
the court said: "We find the law well-settled,
that when the State charges a citizen with
crime, his guilt must be established beyond a
reasonable d)ubt. We apply this rule to the
worst men about whose sanity no doubt is
raised, and turn them loose to repeat their
crimes, because they are entitled to the hu-
man doctrine of doubts. With what show of
reason or humanity could we reverse the rule
as to that unfortunate class of citizens whose
memory and discretion is found to be of
doubtful soundness, and subject them to im-
prisonment for life?"
So in Texas it was said in 1854: "Insanity
is an exception to the general rule; and be-
fore any man can claim the benefit of the ex-
ception, he must prove that he is within it." as
In a more recent case, decided in 1880, the
Court of Appeals declared that the prisoner's
insanity must be made to appear to the satis-
faction of the jury trying him.3 4 Until this
is made clearly to appear, he is to be pre-
sumed to have a sufficient degree of reason
to be responsible for his acts.
In Viiginia the Court of Appeals in 1871
considered this whole subject, the matter be-
ing elaborately reviewed, and it was decided
that the prisoner must prove the fact of his
insanity to the satisfaction of the jury.35
The argument of public safety is again ad-
vanced. "Insanity is easily, feigned," said
31 Lynch v. Commonwealth, 77 Pa. St. 205; Meyers
v. Commonwealth, 88 Pa. St, 141; Pannell v. Com-
monwealth, 86 Pa. St. 268; Sayres v. Commonwealth,
88 Pa. St. 801.
32 Dove v. State, 3 Heisk. 348 (1872).
33 Carter v. State, 12 Tex. 600.
34 Clark v. State, 8 Tex. Ct. of App. 350.
35 Boswell's Case, 20 Grattan, 860.
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the court, "and hard to be disproved, and
public safety requires that it should not be
established by less than satisfactory evidene,
Some of the cases have gone so far as to
place the presumption of sanity on the same
ground with the presumption of innocence,
and to require the same degree of evidence
to repel it. But I do not think it is neces-
sary or proper to go to that extent."
11. The second theory is that the burden
of proof rests upon the State. It must be
conceded that the cases which maintain this
theory do so in the face of an overwhelming
weight of authority. The courts of Ala-
bama, Arkansas, California, Connecticut,
Delaware, Georgia, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, New
Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
Tennessee, Texas and Virginia, present a most
formidable array of arthorities against this
theory. For while some few of them hold that
the prisoner must establish his insanity be-
yond a doubt, and the others that a prepon-
derance of the evidence is sufficient, they are
all agreed that the burden rests with him and
not with the State. It will be found, how-
ever, that the contrary theory has found fa-
vor with some of our ablest and most enlight-
ened courts.
In Illinois, in Fisher's Case, 36 decided in
1859, the first of these theories was adopted,
and the burden was held to be on the pris-
oner. But in 1863 this case was overruled
and declared to have been decided under pe-
culiar circumstances, not admitting of much
deliberation. The presumption of innocence
is pronounced to be as strong as the presump-
tion of sanity, and it is said that the jury
must acquit if they have a well-founded doubt
of the prisoner's sanity. "The human mind
revolts at the idea of executing a person whose
guilt is not proved, a well-founded doubt
of his sanity being entertained by the jury." 37
The matter came up again in 1866, when the
court explained the preceding case and de-
clared that it deemed sanity as essential an
ingredient in crime as the overt act. "We
wish to be understood as saying that the bur-
den of proof is on the prosecution to prove
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, whatever
the defense may be. If insanity is relied on,
26 23 111. 293.
37 HOpplB v. People, 31 Ill. 885.
and evidence given tending to establish that
unfortunate condition of mind, and a reason-
able well founded doubt is thereby raised of
the sanity of the accused, every principle of
justice and humanity demand that the accused
shall have the benefit of the doubt." 38
In Indiana in 1862 it was held to be the
duty of the jury to acquit if a reasonable
doubt of sanity. was entertained. 39 In 1869
the question arose again, and a similar ruling
was obtained.4 0 In 1879 the slbjcct was
again presented to the attention of the court.
It was declared unnecessar'that the evi-
dence should preponderate in favor of ins:n-
ity. A reasonable doubt was sufficient for
an acquittal. If the prisoner raises a reason-
able doubt as to his sanity, it is necessary
that the State should prove mental soundness
beyond a reasonable doubt. 41.
In Kansas the same theory is maintained
with ability. In 1873 the Supreme Court of
that State declared that the fact of soundness
of mind was as much an essential ingredient
of the crime of murder as was the fact of
killing, or malice, or any other fact or ingre-
dient of murder. "It ought to be made out,"
said the court, "in the same way, by the
same party, and by evidence of the same
kind and degree, and as conclusive in its char-
acter, as is required in making dut any other
essential fact, ingredient, or element of mur-
der." 42
In Michigan a similar view is taken of this
question, and it is conceded that the judiciary
of this State is second to none of our State
tribunals. The question was very fully con-
sidered in People v. Garbutt, 43 the opinion be-
ing delivered by Chief Justice Cooley. In
speaking of the cases holding the burden of
proof to be upon the prisoner, it was said that
they "overlook or disregard an important and
necessary ingredient in the crime of murder;
and they strip the defendant of that presump-
tion of innocence which the humanity of the
law casts over him, and which attends him
from the, initiation of the proceedings until
the verdict is rendered." Alter showing that
the crime of murder is only committed when
38 Chase v. People, 40 Il. 352.
89 Polk v. State, 19 Ind. 170.
40 Stevens v. People, 31 Ind. 485.
41 Gueting v. State, 66 Ind. 94.
42 State v. Crawford, 11 Kan. 32.
43 17 Mich. 9.
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a person of sound mind and discretion un-
lawfully killed another with malice, express
or implied, it is declared that the prosecution
takes upon itself the burden of establishing
not only the killing, but the malicious intent.
"There is no such thing in law as a separa-
tion of the ingredients of the offense so as to
leave a part to be established by the prosecu-
tion, while as to the rest the defendant takes
upon himself the burden of proving a nega-
tive. The idea that the burden of proof
shifts in these cases is unphilosophical, and
at war with fundamental principles of crim-
inal law. The presumption of innocence is a
shield to the defendant throughout the pro-
ceedings, until the verdict of the jury estab-
lishes the fact that beyond a reasonable doubt
he not only.committed the act, but that he
did so with malicious intent." 44
In Mississippi this doctrine is also main-
tained, and with marked ability. The sub-
jdct was considered in 1879, and it was said:
"There can be no crime without mental ac-
countallility, and it is just as essential to
show the conscious mind as the unlawful act.
But it is said that the law presumes sanity.
So the law presumes malice from the fact of
killing; but if anything in the testimony,
either of the State or of the defend 1nt, sug-
gests a reasonable doubt of its existence, no-
body ever supposed that the State could stop
short of removing this doubt, and of estab-
lishing this nmalice to a moral certainty."
The court declares that it fails to see any
consistency or logic in holding that the State
ihust establish all the elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt, with the excep-
tion of the prisoner's sanity, which may be
assumed on less satisfactory proof. "How
can a jury say," asks the court: "We have
no doubt of the guilt of the prisoner, but we
do doubt whether he was sane? If a jury in
a capital case should bring in such a verdict,
would it not be judicial murder to inflict a'
sentence of death?" 45
In Nebraska the same question came up in
1876, and a similar conclusion was arrived
at.16
In New Hampshire, also, this view
is taken of the question. It was thus
44 See People v. Finley, 38 Mich. 482.
45 Cunningham v. State, 56 Miss. 272.
46 Wright v. People, 4 Neb. 408.
settled in 1861, in State v. Bartlett, 7
and the conflict in the adjudged cases
was declared to be due to an unjustifia-
ble attempt to apply to criminal causes the
rules which govern the trial of issues in civil
causes. To shift the burden of proving in-
sanity from the State to the prisoner, is pro-
nounced as being "utterly at war with the
humane principle which, in favorem vitce,
requires the guilt of a prisoner to/be estab-
lished beyond a reasonable doubt." In 1870
this doctrine was affirmed in State v. Jones.48
In New York it 'must be considered as
doubtful which of these theories is to be rec-
ognized. People v. McCann, 49 has been very
generally cited as establishing the princip!e
that the burden of proof rested with the
State, but later cases involve the question in
great uncertainty.
The rulings which the court will no doubt
be asked to make in the Guiteau case as to
the burden of proof, and as td the test of re-
sponsibility when insanity is interposed as a
defense, are awaited with great interest. The
questions will no doubt be ably presented to
the court, and the admirable bearing of the
trial judge, and the impartial manner in which
he has held the scales of justice even, give
every reason to hope that the very solemn
questions involved will not be in any way pre-
judiced by detestation of the prisoner, nor by
outside clamor demanding his execution.
HENRY WADE ROGERS.
47 43 N. 1-. 224,
48150 N. H. 36, 400.
49 16 N. Y.. 58.
* EVIDENCE BY PRISONERS--G.UITEAU'S
rRIAL.
Many things connected with Guiteau's
wearisome trial astonish, and even shock, an
English reader. Not the least strange aspect
of it is the latest. Guiteau himself has
given evidence in court. His own counsel
called him as a witness to prove the defense
of insanity. He was questioned by Mr.
Scoville as to the chief events of hi§ life from
infancy, his connection with the Onedia com-
munity, his founding a newspaper, his in-
come, his religious beliefs, his experience as
a lecturer, his hunt after a public office, and
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